Introduction
The aim of this contribution is to briefly consider and compare the various avenues followed in the Netherlands and South Africa in achieving the desired protection of fundamental rights, and ultimately good governance. These legal systems are chosen as both follow quite different routes to securing such protection, thereby inviting the question whether their different approaches are justified? The comparison will be conducted by comparing both legal systems as to the source of the rights protected, the character of such rights and the loci of protection within each system. But first the idea of fundamental rights protection is explored below in laying the groundwork for comparing the Netherlands and South Africa.
Fundamental rights protection as a common good
Good governance is increasingly placed on the agenda in modern societies. This is also true as far as the study of law is concerned. Gone are the days when the focus of academic endeavour simply rested on a thorough study of institutions, simply 'governance' if you will. The emphasis has shifted from an interest in how power is created and channelled, to how it should be exercised, hence 'good' governance. 
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For example, the nineteenth century liberal rechtsstaat may have been a vehicle with which to secure legality, namely the requirement that all state action must have a foundation in law, but it failed to ensure the integrity of the laws passed. 2 In this regard one only has to recall the Second World War and the atrocities committed which were often sanctioned by some or other law produced by the corrupted German rechtsstaat.
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In other words, the liberal rechtsstaat with its emphasis on the technical nature of laws was complemented by a deep concern as to the nature of such laws.
This deep concern for the justifiability of the content of laws can be identified as the material rechtsstaat.
The fact that a norm can technically be identified as a law is no longer good enough. This is also clearly evidenced by the shift after the War to fundamental rights protection as a common good. It was realised, more than ever before, that laws not only had to satisfy the formal requirements of legality, but cardinally also the substantive requirements of legitimacy. 4 The rechtsstaat, declaring the supremacy of law, not only had to ensure that laws were properly passed, but also that they respected certain minimum notions of justice. The latter is something which could no longer be left to the good will and discretion of the designated lawgiver, even if it was democratically legitimated. The 'good society' was no longer simply the concern of politics, but became increasingly a point of debate and contestation before the courts, especially in the form of fundamental rights.
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The acceptance of the Universal Declaration of Rights in 1948 set the tone for more awareness and activism in respect of basic rights, not only at the international level but also at the national level, not only in parliament but also 2 Van Eikema Hommes 1978 TSAR 45-46; Zoethout Rechtsstaat 59-60. 3 Stern 1981 TSAR 245-245 speaks in this context of the Rechtsstaat being turned into a Gesetzesstaat. 'Recht' is then intended to mean law as morally justifiable, while 'Gesetz' is intended to mean legal rules devoid of any moral authority. 4
Böckenförde State, Society and Liberty 66-67; Van Eikema Hommes supra n 2 at 46-47; Zoethout supra n 2 at 60-63. Generally the protection of rights can be situated between two poles, these being the political and judicial. 9 In other words, who has the final say as to the protection of rights, the courts or parliament? Prior to the Second World War the emphasis rested on the political protection of rights, or the parliamentary model as it is also sometimes called.
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The Netherlands, under the influence of the French Revolution with its emphasis on popular legitimacy and its distrust of higher law applied by judges,
The supreme interpreter of human rights was the political voice of the electorate, and often only that voice. Courts were expected to apply the law and not to shape it. This was also the tradition in both the Netherlands and South Africa. 
22/252
national bills of rights is certainly not waning, but is faced by a competition of sorts when burgeoning international sources are taken into account.
International protection
Good governance by means of rights protection is far from being solely a national matter nowadays. This raises interesting questions as to the relation between national and international human rights regimes. These questions are solved differently from state to state, however two main possibilities can be identified. International law, including its accompanying human rights guarantees, can have direct effect in a national legal order or can enjoy effect only after having been transformed from international to national law. 19 The first option, monism, is characteristic of the Dutch legal system, whereas the second, dualism, is characteristic of the South African order. This characteristic of the Dutch legal system has its foundations in unwritten constitutional law, while the Constitution on its part places a duty on the judiciary in section 94 not to apply national legal provisions where and to the extent these conflict with international law. 20 International law is thus hierarchically superior to national law, including the Constitution.
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This stands in contrast to the South African position where the Constitution is always superior to international law, which in principle has to be enacted as national law before it may be applied by the courts. 22 A conflict between a transformed treaty and the South African Constitution is resolved by following the latter, this is also the case when a conflict arises between the Constitution and customary international law. 
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Although the Netherlands knew a bill of rights since the nineteenth century the Constitution saw the inclusion of a bar in 1848 to the judiciary reviewing compliance with constitutional provisions, so confirming the supremacy of parliament. This prohibition, which is at present contained in section 120, has become a standard feature of the Dutch Constitution and has survived the document's numerous revisions. 27 Its effect is to prohibit the judiciary from testing whether acts of parliament comply with the rights in the Constitution or the procedure prescribed for the enactment of such laws. 28 However, section 120 does not prevent the judiciary from reviewing laws of a lesser status than acts of parliament, such as delegated legislation and provincial and local ordinances, for constitutional compliance so long as such an inquiry does not implicitly review an act of parliament in the process. 29 The idea was to allow the judiciary some measure of review, while still protecting parliament's primacy in passing acts. Reality, as almost always, took on a different shape. This is because the judiciary increasingly reviewed legislation, including acts of parliament, for compliance with international law, thereby denting parliament's legislative supremacy.
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This anomaly in Dutch law of judicial review in respect of international law, but only of laws of a lesser status than acts of parliament when the Constitution is at stake, has gained widespread criticism. 
Justification
It then seems as if the current state of affairs will remain so for quite a bit longer.
The above raises the question as to the justifiability of these very different avenues pursued in respecting fundamental rights. The one, namely Dutch, sees a wish to preserve parliament's supremacy in respect of the Constitution, but sees it broken in respect of international law; while the other, South African, chooses to subject parliament to the judicially enforced Constitution and sees international law playing only an indirect role as an interpretative aid.
It can be argued that these different routes to the protection of rights are justified by reference to their context. The strong arm of the judicial branch, as it were, was seen as necessary in South Africa in aiding the consolidation of a sound democratic system after having suffered legislative abuse for so long. In comparison the South African Constitution states in its general limitation clause contained in section 36(1) that a right may only be limited by a "law of general application", thereby requiring legality but not restricting the state in its delegation to other organs of the capacity to set limits to rights. The rather technical Dutch approach should, arguably, only be viewed as important guidelines for parliament when considering new legislation, instead as hard and fast rules to be applied by the judiciary. This is the case as the strict judicial review of these intricate delegation provisions, which some may even call dated relics of the nineteenth century as to the mode of limitation, may obstruct efficient administration of the state by being too formalistic.
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However, Dutch citizens on the other hand can still turn to international law for the substantive protection of their rights, an avenue which is closed in South
Africa. This further difference is probably also justified. South Africa has to create and foster its own particular human rights culture in order to address its own past more so than the Netherlands, which can rely on a well developed regional system of protection in the form of the European Court of Human Rights, something which is still in its early stages in Africa. Again, the different approaches adopted in the Netherlands and South Africa can be understood, and probably accepted, by reference to each country's constitutional development and particular characteristics.
Character of rights
The twentieth century has known something of a rights explosion. Not only has the awareness of rights increased but also the number of rights. Whereas the nineteenth century saw a decided focus on civil and political rights, classical rights in other words, the previous century saw a shift to include socioeconomic rights. The material rechtsstaat developed a new social dimension, not only does the focus of law rest on the organisation of the state and the accompanying political rights, but also on the quality of life within that state. elected to make such policy. This is also generally the case in the Netherlands.
Although there exists no bright-line rule in this regard, courts usually hold that matters related to socio-economic rights are not for them to decide, but are mere policy instructions aimed at government and not hard law. In other words, areas in which people are free to act and where the state has to withhold itself from action. This relies on the divide between action and inaction. Where the state is called upon to act, such as in the provision of socio-economic rights, the courts are reluctant to interfere; but where the state is called upon to refrain from action, such as is generally the case with classical rights, the courts are generally more inclined to investigate 29/252 the matter. This dichotomy has given much fuel for an at times heated academic debate as to the judicial enforceability of socio-economic rights in contrast to classical rights. 44 Although one can on principle grounds advocate that socio-economic rights must be judicially enforced, this picture may change when the reality of a particular situation is considered. For example, the Netherlands is a highly developed country with an elaborate social welfare system. It is a society of little want in comparison to most other countries in the world. This enviable state of affairs has to date then also largely been the product of the political process. The introduction of social legislation on a large scale, starting in the 1950s, came about by political imperative, not judicial imperative. In other words, there is no general feeling in the Netherlands that socio-economic rights are not to be entrusted to parliament or that the situation will radically change were the judiciary to enforce such rights. Politicians are perceived as probably better placed to make such decisions than judges.
The purpose of this contribution is however not to repeat this debate, but to venture some thoughts on the justifiability of the status quo in South Africa in comparison to that in the Netherlands regarding the character of rights and their judicial enforceability. In other words, is the fact that socio-economic rights are generally not enforced by the judiciary in the Netherlands justified, given the outspoken judicial interest in such rights in South Africa? The answer to this question is probably yes.
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South Africa on the other is undoubtedly also justified in having a judiciary which is called upon to test government policy in the socio-economic sphere. It may not be forgotten that South Africa knew a watershed moment, namely that between a society based on a supreme parliament that negated rights and a 44 See generally Vlemminx Nieuw Profiel. 45 See Burkens et al supra n 20 at 184 who explain that parliament is often perceived as being better placed to decide constitutional issues, as it is also responsible for adopting the Constitution in its guise as constitutional assembly.
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dispensation based on a justiciable supreme constitution that treasures rights. 
Locus of protection
The South African situation given its past experience with the overconcentration of power in the legislative branch is rightfully wary of placing all its eggs in one basket as it were. Engaging the courts then seems to be a logical response to the country's history. The great social need in South Africa could certainly also be mentioned as another reason as to why not only the legislative branch of the trias politica is to be engaged, but also the judicial branch. Simply put, the social project to be embarked upon is so large and important that the courts, as co-arbiters, may serve to help government in approaching such important matters from the right perspective.
The locus of protection refers to the notion of a centrifugal point or force of fundamental rights protection within a particular system. the supreme law of the republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.
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The locus of the protection of fundamental rights in the Netherlands is not a unitary but a composite one. Rights protection is not as focused on the Constitution and its dictates as is the case in South Africa, but is instead a joint venture between the Constitution, parliament and international law.
When studying fundamental rights protection in South Africa, the Constitution is to be viewed not only as the starting point, but also as the destination, as its provisions have the final say so to speak. This stands quite in contrast to the Dutch system. 49 As a matter of fact, the debate has not been settled as to whether the Dutch parliament derives its legislative power from the Constitution or whether it may lay claim to inherent power. 
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